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social sides of it, although there have also been important changes in the field of 
technical advance in the last 20 years. One of capitalism’s main virtues is the strong 
incentive it gives to dynamism, enterprise and the innovation process. Every 
revolutionary new product (for civilian use) has been brought about by the capitalist 
system. The socialist system was capable, at most, of developing new military products. 
The article analyzes how far the radical difference can be explained by the innate 
tendencies and basic attributes of the two systems. Our daily lives have been 
transformed by these new products (for instance, the sphere of information and 
communications by the computer, the mobile phone and the internet). While many 
people see all these as favorable changes, fewer discern the causal relation between the 
capitalist system and rapid technical progress. Yet the usual syllabus of microeconomics 
does not enlighten students on this important virtue of capitalism, which is not 
adequately emphasized in the statements of leading politicians either. 
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1 Introduction 
The essence of post-socialist transformation can be easily summarized in a few words: a 
large set of countries moved from socialism to capitalism. This shift itself is the 
strongest historical evidence of the superiority of capitalism over socialism. 
Nevertheless, it is our obligation to continue the impartial and unbiased comparison of 
the two systems. All the more so since we are living in difficult times, and nostalgia for 
the failed old regime can be felt by a significant portion of the population. We must 
convince our fellow citizens that we are heading in the right direction. There are several 
arguments to support this optimistic belief. I would like to spell out only one virtue of 
capitalism: its innovative and dynamic nature. In the first part of the study I argue that 
rapid innovation and dynamism are not a random phenomenon which may or may not 
occur, but a deeply rooted system-specific property of capitalism. The same can be said 
about its opposite, the socialist system. Its inability to create great revolutionary new 
products and delay in other dimensions of technical progress are not due to some errors 
in policy, but are a deeply rooted system-specific property of socialism. Unfortunately, 
this highly visible great virtue of capitalism does not get the appreciation it would 
deserve. It is completely ignored by most people and even by most professional students 
of alternative systems, and I feel angry and frustrated watching that neglect, motivating 
me to choose the theme of this study. 
 
Entering the world of capitalism creates the conditions of innovative processes and 
faster technical progress, and also increases the chances that the country will take this 
opportunity. But it does not guarantee full success immediately. The second and third 
part of my study will discuss problems of the transition period.   
 
The ‘Great Transformation’ is an ensemble of several processes. Firstly, there were 
changes in the political domain: the transition from a single-party dictatorship to a 
multi-party democracy. This transformation put an end to the state-protected privileges 
of the Marxist-Leninist ideology, and gave the green light to the competition of various 
schools of thought. Then there were changes in the economic domain: the predominance 
of state-ownership was replaced by the predominance of private ownership. Associated 
with the transformation of ownership forms, the relative influence of various co-
ordination mechanisms also went through radical changes. The impact of centralized 
bureaucratic control became much smaller, and the influence of market co-ordination 
and other decentralized procedures increased dramatically. These profound political and 
economic changes associated with several other changes jointly mean the change of the 
system, i.e., the transition from socialism to capitalism.  
 
The post-socialist region has experienced another class of changes in the domain of 
technical progress as well. Although, due to its familiarity, I apply the term ‘technical 
progress’, in my interpretation it is a much wider phenomenon. Based on the stream of 
new products and new technologies its effects go far beyond the technical aspects. It is a 
part of modernization, generating profound changes in our lives. This meaning of the 
term ‘technical progress’ will unfold in the context of my study. Technical progress 
went on, of course, all the time, also before 1989, but following 1989 it has accelerated 
spectacularly.   2
 
In our profession, or sub-profession, all the experts on post-socialist transition have 
been concentrating their attention on the study of political, economic and social changes 
as part of the Great Transformation. Let us confess frankly, we perhaps briefly mention 
technical progress once in a while, but we have not studied thoroughly the interaction 
between changing the system on the one hand, and changing our profile in generating 
and using new products and new technologies, on the other. I myself have certainly 
missed this point before. I have written two studies summarizing the main consequences 
of the changes after 1989, but discussing only political and economic changes and their 
interaction (Kornai 2001, 2006). I start today to make up what I missed before. Thus, 
the subject of the second and third part of my study is the interaction between the post-
1989 change of the system and the acceleration of technical progress.  
2  Capitalism, socialism, and technical progress 
2.1  Revolutionary new products 
The complex process of technical progress is composed of several sub-processes. Let us 
begin with the great, break-through, revolutionary innovations, illustrated by 87 
examples in Table 1.1 As we take a look at the role of socialist countries in creating 
revolutionary new products, we have to go back in time to the birth of the Soviet Union, 
the first socialist state. Therefore the period covered by the list starts in 1917. 
 
Since 1917 many innovations of great significance have been born. It is debatable why 
exactly these 87 are included in the table, as we could perhaps find twenty or fifty 
additional ones of no less significance. The selection is arbitrary, yet the list seems to be 
apt to demonstrate that all the innovations mentioned here in a narrower or wider scope 
fundamentally change the everyday practice of people’s lives, work, consumption, 
recreation, and the relationships to others.2 The office and the factory, transportation, 
shopping, housework, education have all changed. The tie between the home and the 
workplace differs, travel has changed as well, and we could continue listing, at great 
lengths, the effects of innovation causing permanent upheaval and the reorganization of 
life. The modern world is made dynamic by the perpetual flow of innovations. We 
consider our times more dynamic compared to earlier periods, because many more 
innovations are being introduced, which are generating much deeper changes in our 
everyday life. 
                                                 
1 The literature on technical progress and innovation distinguishes new products and new technologies, 
although the appearance of these two categories is often intertwined. For example, while the Xerox 
machine is a new product, it has also introduced a new technology of printing. Table 1 lists new products, 
because of their salience in everyday life. 
2 Certain classes of innovation were excluded at the selection. Criteria of exclusion are explained partly 
in the footnote at the bottom of the table, and partly in later sections of the study.     3
Table 1: Revolutionary innovations 
 
INNOVATION   YEAR   COUNTRY   COMPANY  
Computer, information, communication 
Integrated circuit   1961  USA  Fairchild  
Touch-tone telephone   1963  USA  AT&T  
Fax 1966  USA  Xerox 
Optical fiber cable   1970  USA  Corning 
Pocket electronic calculator   1971  USA  Bowmar 
Word processing    1972  USA  Wang  
Microprocessor 1974  USA  Intel 
Laser printer  1976  USA  IBM 
Modem 1978  USA  Hayes 
MS-DOS operating system   1980  USA  Microsoft 
Hard disk drive  1980  USA  Hard disk drive 
Graphical user interface  1981  USA  Xerox 
Laptop 1981  USA  Epson 
Touch screen   1983  USA  Hewlett-Packard 
Mobil telephone  1983  USA  Motorola 
Mouse 1984  USA  Apple 
Web search engine   1994,   USA  WebCrawler  
Pendrive 2000  USA  IBM 
Skype (peer-to-peer phone)  2003  Estonia   Skype  
YouTube video sharing website  2005  USA  YouTube 
Household, food, clothing       
Tea bag   1920  USA  Joseph Krieger 
Hair dryer, hand held, electric   1920  USA  Hamilton Beach 
Wall plug   1920  UK  Rawlplug Co. 
Spin-dryer   1924  USA  Savage  
Automatic pop-up toaster   1925  USA  Waters Genter Co. 
Steam electric iron  1926  USA  Eldec  
Electric refrigerator   1927  USA  General Electric  
Air conditioning  1928  USA  Carrier Engineering Co. 
Neon light   1938  USA  General Electric   4
Nylon 1939  USA  DuPont   
Espresso machine (high pressure)  1946  Italy   Gaggia  
Microwave oven   1947  USA  Raytheon 
Drive-through restaurant  1948,   USA  In-n-Out Burger,  
Saran plastic wrap   1949  USA  Dow Chemical 
Polyester   1953  USA  DuPont 
Tefal kitchenware   1956  France  Tefal 
Hook-and-loop fastener (Velcro)   1957  USA  Velcro 
Athletic shoe  1958  UK  Reebok 
Halogen lamp  1959  USA  GE 
Food processor   1960  USA  Roboot-Coupe 
Tetra Pak  1961  Sweden  Tetra Pak 
Beverage can  1963  USA  Pittsburgh Brewing Co 
Health, cosmetics 
Adhesive bandage (Band-aid)  1921  USA  Johnson & Johnson 
Facial tissue (Kleenex)  1924  USA  Kimberley-Clark 
Paper towel   1931  USA  Scott Paper Co. 
Electric shaver  1931  USA  Schick 
Aerosol container  1947  USA  Airosol Co. 
Disposable diaper  1949  USA  Johnson & Johnson 
Transistor hearing aid  1952  USA  Sonotone 
Roll-on deodorant  1955  USA  Mum  
Disposable razor  1975  USA  BIC  
Liquid detergent  1982  USA  Procter & Gamble  
Office 
Adhesive tape (pressure sensitive 
Scotch tape) 
1930 USA  3M   
Ball point pen   1943  Argentina  Biro Pens 
Correction fluid  1951  USA  Mistake Out 
Copy-machine   1959  USA  Haloid Xerox 
‘Post-it’ 1980  USA  3M 
Transport  
Escalator   1921  USA  Otis 
Parking meter   1935  UK  Dual Parking Meter Co. 
Scooter   1946  Italy  Piaggio 
Instant coffee   1938  Switzerland  Nestle 
Electric clothes dryer   1938  USA  Hamilton Manufacturing Co    5
Jet-propelled passenger aeroplane   1952  USA  Comet  
Black box (for aeroplanes).  1958  UK  S. Davall & Son  
Leisure   
Drive-in cinema   1933  USA  Hollingshead 
Instant camera  1948  USA  Polaroid 
TV remote control  1956  USA  Zenith 
Plastic construction toy   1958  Denmark  Lego 
Barbie doll   1959  USA  Mattel 
Quartz wristwatch   1969  Japan  Seiko  
Video cassette recorder (VCR)  1971  Netherlands,   Philips 
Walkman 1979  Japan  Sony 





Portable video-game  1989  Japan  Nintendo 
Digital camera  1991  USA  Kodak 
Book trade on the internet   1995  USA  Amazon 
DVD  1996  Japan   Philips, Sony, Toshiba  
Commerce, banking 
Supermarket   1930  USA  King Kullen 
Shopping cart   1937  USA  Humpty Dumpty Supermarket 
Shopping mall   1950  USA  Northgate Mall 
Charge card   1950  USA  Diners Club,  
Credit card  1958  USA  Bank of America 
Automated Teller Machine (ATM)  1967  UK  Barclays Bank 
Express shipping   1973  USA  Federal Express 
Bar code   1974  USA  IBM 
e-commerce   1998  USA  eBay 
Note: Entries are selected out of a larger set of innovations surveyed in various collections and lists of 
relevant inventions and innovations. The main inclusion criterion was the relevance for large groups of 
users, well-known to the majority of people, and not only to small groups of experts. Some of the criteria of 
exclusion are discussed in the text: (1) The list contains only Schumpeterian-type innovations. Accordingly, 
innovations initiated and financed mainly by the military are excluded. (2) New products and services used 
for medical care, i.e. medicines, diagnostic equipments etc. are not included, simply because of the 
difficulty of selection of the greatest innovations out of hundreds or thousands of new drugs and new 
medical instruments. (Perhaps at a later stage of research this sector might be included.) 
Source: The source of several entries were Ceruzzi (2000) and Harrison (2003, 2004.) The source of each 
entry is on record, and is available from the author at request. 
 
Out of the 87 innovations about 25-30 are related to computers, digital equipment and 
information. This subset attracts the most intensive attention from the public and the 
academic world. A large and fast-growing literature is studying the social effects of the   6
information society.3 My study cannot penetrate deeply into this exciting subject, 
because I would like to cover a wider set of innovations. Around 60 out of 87 in the list 
are innovations unrelated or not closely related to the revolution in the information–
communication sphere. Admitting wholeheartedly the extraordinary importance of 
information and communication, there have been and there will be innovations in many 
areas outside this area. For the poorest inhabitants of a poor Albanian or Siberian village 
the introduction of the refrigerator or the appearance of a supermarket might contribute 
to relevant changes in life-style—the use of the computer might come later. I would like 
to discuss certain issues of technical progress as a whole, i.e., the technical change 
related and unrelated to the revolution of information and communication.     
 
Innovation is preceded by invention. The first step is made by the inventor: the 
professional or amateur researcher, the academic scholar, or the company engineer, is 
the one to whom the new idea occurs. However, the originality of the idea, its novelty, 
and its ingenuity are not at all enough. In the second step the invention becomes an 
innovation; the practical introduction begins, i.e. the organization of production and the 
diffusion of the new product, or the application of a new organizational form. If we turn 
our attention towards this second phase, to the practical execution of the change (Table 
1 indicates the country in which the innovator company is operating), we will, without 
exception, read the names of capitalist countries here. As the time period captured in the 
table includes the entire era during which the socialist system existed, it is clear that in 
no instance did the innovation pioneer in a socialist country.4 
2.2  Following the pioneers, the diffusion of innovation 
While revolutionary innovation is the most important component of technical progress, 
there are other components as well. The pioneer has followers. Beside the first 
innovator, after some time-lag, various other organizations participate in minor quality 
improvements, implementation of small but not negligible inventions, and in the process 
of diffusion. The innovation appears first in a certain country, but then followers show 
up in other countries as well. 
 
The socialist system in numerous spheres followed the pioneering inventions born in a 
capitalist country, taking place in diverse forms. Sometimes it was just imitation. The 
mere reproduction of the model, perhaps its makeshift copying, was simple. Breaking 
up the secret was a relatively more difficult task. The reinvention of the innovations 
protected by patents and business privacy virtually developed into an art in socialist 
economies. Industrial espionage, the stealing of intellectual property, was a further 
possibility.5 However, despite the diverse attempts, regarding these processes the 
socialist economy sluggishly trudged behind the capitalist economy.  
 
                                                 
3 Perhaps the most influential work in this area is Castells (1996-98). See also Fuchs (2008). 
4 Table 1 excludes innovations initiated in the military sector of the economy. The military sector 
produced innovations appearing first in a socialist country. I will return to that point further down. 
5 Stealing Western intellectual property in the high-tech sphere was hindered by various barriers, e.g. by 
strictly enforced prohibition of exporting certain products to communist countries (the so-called COCOM 
list of products used for military purposes). In spite of strict prohibitions, the co-operation of smart spies 
and technical experts succeeded in slipping through the holes of the barriers.     7
Let me draw your attention to two details. First, in the socialist countries this delay, the 
followers’ lag behind the pioneers, was significantly larger in magnitude than in the 
capitalist countries; see for example the data on Tables 2 and 3. Examining a longer 
time period, the lag measured in years was mostly growing instead of shrinking. 



















Cellophane  France  1917 USA  1924 Germany  1925 1936  19 
Polystyrene  Germany  1930 USA  1933 Italy  1943 1955–59  25–29 
PVC  Germany  1931 USA  1933 Japan  1939 1940  9 
Silicon 
polymers 
USA 1941  Germany  1950 Japan  1951 1947  6
* 













UK 1959  France  1960  1970  13 
Note: 
*In this case the Soviet Union followed the pioneering country faster than the capitalist economies. 
Source. Amann et al. (1977: 272–85). 
Table 3: Time-lag in following the leaders of innovation: controlled machine tools 
 Reached  by 
USSR in 
USSR (+ in advance; – behind) in relation to 
USA UK  Japan  FRG 
Start of research  1949  –2  –1  +4  +6 
First prototype  1958  –6  –2  –  – 
Start of industrial production*  1965  –8  –2  +1  –1 
First machining center  1971  –12  (–10)  –5  –10 
First third generation control system  1973  –7  (–5)  (–5)  (–5) 
First use of computer for control  1973  –6  (–4)  –5  (–4) 
Note: ( ) estimate. *50 units or more per annum. 
Source: Amann et al. (1977: 41).  
 
And second, the diffusion of new products and new technologies was much faster in the 
capitalist economies than in the socialist ones; for example see Table 4 and Figure 1.   8
Table 4: Penetration of modern technology: steel industry, continuous casting (%)  
Country  Continuous casting per total production 
 1970  1980  1987 
Socialist countries 
Bulgaria 0  0  10 
Czechoslovakia 0  2  8 
East Germany  0  14  38 
Hungary 0  36  56 
Poland 0  4  11 
Romania 0  18  32
* 
Soviet Union  4  11  16 
Capitalist countries 
France 1  41  93 
Italy 4  50  90 
Japan 6  59  93 
Spain 12  49  67 
UK 2  27  65 
USA 4  20  58 
West Germany  8  46  88 
Note: 
*1986. 
Source: Finansy i Statistika (1988: 109). 
Figure 1: Penetration of modern technology: steel industry, oxygen steel 
(oxygen steel as a proportion of total steel output, % of total) 
 
Source: Amann et al. (1977: 97).  
   9
The tables and figures shown here are only illustrations. The large amount of empirical 
evidence in the comparative economic literature also supports the proposition that the 
socialist system was sluggish in following the pioneering innovations.6 
2.3 Innovative  entrepreneurship under capitalism 
Thus, capitalism produced all the break-through innovations and was much faster in 
other aspects of technical progress—historical experience grants irrefutable evidence. 
Nevertheless, let us add the causal explanation of that crucial systemic difference. In 
capitalism the entrepreneur plays a distinguished role.7 My study adopts this term in the 
sense used by Joseph Schumpeter (1912/1934). Beyond terminology, Schumpeter’s 
theories about development and the nature of capitalism leave their mark on the 
message of this study.8  
 
Innovative entrepreneurship is a function, a role, which can be fulfilled by an individual 
alone or by teaming up with one or more partners, or with the support of a small firm. 
Or even a large firm can function as an entrepreneur. The main point is that the 
entrepreneur is the one who brings together the necessary financial and personal 
conditions that the innovation calls for, in other words, the human resources, the 
physical instruments and financial resources essential to the activity. S/he is the one 
finding the place of application; s/he directs the execution of the change. Often a long 
time passes before a promising invention is taken up by a true entrepreneur.9 Probably it 
happens many times that an invention or discovery and an entrepreneur do not find each 
other. Fortunately, it is quite frequent that the match is made. 
 
From Table 1 it emerges how many different types of innovation are possible—not only 
new products, or new production technologies, but new organizational forms as well. 
 
In most cases the Schumpeterian entrepreneur drives the innovation process during the 
first realization of the revolutionary innovation. Diffusion, i.e. the process following the 
pioneering innovation, is also mostly driven by entrepreneurs. The initiative appears at 
the beginning of the sequence. For example, in 1996 Larry Page, a PhD student at 
Stanford, is searching for a dissertation topic. Some specific issues about browsing the 
internet attract his attention. He teams up with another student, Sergey Brin. They 
develop a ‘search engine’. On the Stanford homepage it receives the name 
‘google.stanford.edu’. In this story these two men unite the two usually separated roles: 
they are the inventors and at the same time they are the innovators. Skipping over all the 
intermediate stages, let us jump to where we are right now. Google is one of the world’s 
largest and wealthiest companies.10 Its worldwide network is using about 450,000 
                                                 
6 The most important empirical works on the subject are the books by Amann et al. (1977, 1982). See 
also Berliner (1976), Hanson (1981), Hanson and Pavitt (1987).  
7 Not all entrepreneurs are innovators (Baumol and Schilling 2008). This study is focusing on one 
extremely important class, the entrepreneurs engaged in the process of innovation.  
8 On Schumpeter’s contributions to social science see Heertje (2006) and McCraw (2007). See also 
Baumol (2002). Already the title of his book catches the real essence of the phenomenon I am going to 
discuss: The Free-Market Innovation Machine: Analyzing the Growth Miracle of Capitalism. 
9 One can find numerous examples for this delay in the 1995 book of Rogers. See also Freeman (1982: 
111-12). 
10 For a concise introduction to the Google story, see the company’s own brief summary (Google 2009) 
and the entry on Google in Wikipedia (2009a).   10
servers. I would not like to play lightly with words, but the influence of Google has 
proved to be of revolutionary significance.11 I will return to the Google story, but only 
to illustrate the general characteristics of the innovation process taking place in the 
capitalist environment. 
 
Let me summarize the specific characteristics of the capitalist economy not only making 
the innovation process possible, but also inducing, constantly developing and propelling 
it: 
 
Decentralized initiative. Larry Page and Sergey Brin did not receive any orders from 
their superiors to solve a specific innovational task. They did not have to ask for 
permission from their superiors to work on a special direction of an innovative action. 
The individuals and the decision makers of small firms, or the chief executives of large 
companies – in other words, the separate entities functioning inside the entire system – 
determine for themselves what they want to do.12 
 
Gigantic reward. Today Page and Brin are among the richest men of the world.13 It is 
not the task of this study to analyze the difficult ethical dilemmas of income 
distribution. How large is the reward that is ‘proportional’ to performance? One point is 
certain: the most successful innovations usually (not always, but very often, with a high 
probability) result in enormously large rewards.14 The range of the reward spreads 
rather unevenly. At the end of the scale one can find the owners of gigantic wealth: 
people like Bill Gates, or in the older generations the Fords or the Duponts. The 
entrepreneur leading the technical progress is able to gain a huge monopolistic rent. It is 
worth being the first, even temporarily, because it creates a monopolist position. The 
enormous financial reward is usually accompanied by prestige, fame and reputation. 
 
Competition. This is inseparable from the previous point. Strong, often ruthless 
competition is taking place to attract the customers. The faster and more successful 
innovation is not the exclusive instrument for that purpose, yet a highly important one to 
gain advantage over one’s competitors. 
 
Extensive experimenting. There must have been hundreds, perhaps thousands of 
entrepreneurs wanting to find suitable tools to search the internet. Only a few achieved 
almost as great a break-through as the founders of Google, however, others have been 
also able to realize innovations with fairly large, medium or small success. And there 
must have been many, quite many, who have tried but failed. Moving beyond the 
example, so far no one has assessed the volume of innovational attempts constantly 
occurring in all spheres under capitalism and the distribution of their success and 
failure. Those gaining an impression about this highly important activity can only 
                                                 
11 Based on my personal experience, I admit that it has changed my research habits as well. It is different 
to be a researcher in the Google age than it was earlier, in the Gutenberg era.  
12 Acemoglu, Aghion and their co-authors argue in a recent paper (Acemoglu et al. 2007) both 
theoretically and empirically that pioneering innovation requires decentralization.  
13 According to the well-known ranking of Forbes magazine, they tie for rank No. 5 in the USA. 
14 The Google story can rather be considered a unique case, where the pioneering inventor and the role of 
the innovator are played by the same people. In the more frequent instance of these roles being separated, 
the inventor in some cases does, in others s/he does not, attain benefits from the invention or the 
discovery. The latter was the fate of the computer mouse. The inventor Douglas Engelbart has received no 
financial reward for his ingenious invention. Apple, the innovator company pioneering the mass 
introduction, has produced an enormous profit on this innovation.      11
intuitively sense the huge number of the attempts, and compared to that the rare 
spectacular successes like the story of Google, Microsoft, Tetrapack, Nokia or 
Nintendo. Many highly talented people are motivated exactly for innovation, because—
although with quite a small probability—a phenomenal success is promised, and even 
with a larger probability a more moderate yet still substantial success materializes, and 
that is why it is worth taking up the risk of failure.15  
 
Reserve capital waiting to be invested: the flexibility of financing. The two founders of 
Google gained access to financial resources enabling them to launch the innovative 
activity, the distribution. Successful researcher and innovator Andy Bechtolsheim (who 
happened to be also a wealthy businessman) at the very beginning of the process 
reached into his pocket for his chequebook and signed a US$100,000 cheque. 
 
An innovative enterprise rarely happens to be realized solely from one’s own resources. 
Although there are examples of this as well, resorting to outside resources is much more 
common.16 The diverse forms to open up resources include a bank loan, investors 
willing to take part in the business, or ‘venture capital’ institutions specialized in 
particularly high risk and, in case of success, high reward projects (Bygrave and 
Timmons 1992). Basically, flexible disposable capital is needed in order to realize the 
pioneering introduction and quick diffusion of innovations, including wide range 
experimenting, and within this, eventually unsuccessful attempts. 
 
I do not claim that the Schumpeterian-type entrepreneurship is the only way to generate 
innovative processes in a capitalist system. Let me mention only three of the several 
other non-Schumpeterian frameworks: 
 
(i)  In several instances an important innovation is initiated, financed and 
implemented by the military. For example, in the 1960s there was a strong 
demand expressed by the Pentagon to find ways of a completely decentralized 
mailing service to assure that the destruction of the centre of the postal system 
would not lead to a breakdown of written communication. This requirement of 
the military and the generous financial support of research in that direction led 
to a revolutionary innovation, the creation of email, a completely decentralized 
‘invisible hand’ device for communication. Though at a later stage the free-of-
charge, non-profit email system intertwined with more commercial profit-
oriented activities, email is still a classical example of a non-Schumpeterian 
innovation. 
 
While under socialism competition was eliminated in the centralized, bureaucratically 
managed civilian economy, the Soviet Union and its allies were fatally involved in the 
military race with the West, first of all with the USA. This life-and-death competition 
put the innovative process under sufficient pressure for generating great innovation. The 
first satellite, the Sputnik, was created by the Soviet Union. The sluggishness of 
                                                 
15 On the importance of experimentation see Thomke (2003). 
16 Undoubtedly, there is a connection between the economic booms of the great innovative periods and 
the increase in the available amount of credit. Easily accessible money helps technical progress, but also 
entails the danger of a bubble formation. It is timely to re-read Schumpeter when analyzing the history 
preceding the current crisis (Schumpeter 1939, especially Chapter IV.) The great temptation to discuss 
this aspect is regrettably limited by the available space.    12
technical progress in the civilian sector was overruled by the overall objectives of the 
leadership, to keep pace with, or even jump ahead of, the development of the Western 
military forces.  But when it came to the civilian utilization of a military innovation, the 
inferiority of the socialist system did show up again. In the USA the pioneering military 
applications were followed by the use of satellites for civilian use, leading to rapid 
quality and efficiency improvements in all areas of telecommunication. In the Soviet 
block the civilian application followed only after a long delay. The example of the 
satellites demonstrates that focused action in a highly centralized bureaucratic system 
might produce spectacular results—but without the same strong spillover effect as great 
innovations appearing in a decentralized, entrepreneurial capitalism: 
 
(ii)  In certain instances important research and later, the diffusion of the invention, is 
initiated and financed by civilian, non-military sectors of the government, e.g. 
the agencies in charge of medical care. There are good examples when 
intelligent, competition-.friendly government policy is promoting targeted 
innovation (.e.g. in order to protect the environment).  
 
(iii) In several instances important innovations are initiated, and also executed, by an 
ad hoc ensemble of researchers, or by an association, or by a non-governmental 
and non-profit organization. That is how, for example, one of the most 
significant, truly revolutionary innovations, the World Wide Web started; see the 
memoirs of the pioneer Berners-Lee (1999.) Many other important innovations 
in the sphere of computers, digital applications, information and communication 
started in this civilian, non-profit, associative way of the non-Schumpeterian 
innovation. 
 
Admitting the relevance of non-Schumpeterian processes, most breakthrough 
innovations follow the Schumpeterian path. That is certainly true for the innovations 
targeted at the market of consumer goods and services for practical use in everyday life. 
And even the non-Schumpeterian starts are followed typically by many profit-oriented 
applications, and innovators with a commercial orientation execute the larger share of 
wide diffusion. 
2.4  The impossibility of innovative entrepreneurship under socialism 
Moving on to socialism, let us begin by stepping back to the preceding phase of 
innovation, namely invention. Creative minds lived in the socialist countries as well. 
Excellent scientists and engineers worked there, who made important discoveries and 
inventions that were revolutionarily significant, with a potential to be applied in 
industry and commerce. The first example is the Soviet physicist Abram Joffe, who is 
regarded in the history of science as one of the pioneers of the semi-conductors, today 
playing a fundamentally important role in the electronics industry. He had already come 
forward with his discoveries during the 1930s but the economic environment simply did 
not allow for the introduction of their industrial applications. Much later the 
manufacturing of semi-conductors became dominated by the USA, Japan, Taiwan, 
South Korea; the Soviet Union trailed behind among the slow followers of the leaders.17 
                                                 
17 Joffe was first showered with the highest state awards, and received high academic honors, but during 
the last years of Stalin’s terror he was removed from his high positions as a ‘Zionist’. Whether up or 
down, his discoveries never turned into a revolutionary innovation.    13
 
Jacek Karpinski, a Polish engineer and scientist invented the first mini-computer 
between 1971-73. His name is recognized among the great pioneers of computer 
technology. However, his invention did not become a widely dispersed innovation while 
he lived on Polish soil. Karpinski later emigrated, and his invention, in competition with 
similar discoveries, became a widespread innovation in the capitalist world. 
 
The most famous Hungarian example is the story of Rubik’s cube. I listed this ingenious 
toy among the breakthrough innovations, and it certainly has a legitimate place there. 
The inventor, Ernő Rubik, tried to initiate the worldwide distribution, after seeing the 
enthusiastic reaction of everyone familiar with this intellectual masterpiece, but with a 
rather moderate effect. Later it became a fantastic success when a well-known, truly 
entrepreneurial American toy company bought it and started worldwide marketing. 
 
Even in Hungary only a few know that the floppy disk, the plastic covered simple data 
storage device for personal computers used by millions, was invented by a Hungarian 
engineer, Marcell Jánosi. After inventing it in 1974, Jánosi offered the well functioning 
prototype to the Hungarian industry and exporters in vain; the leaders of the socialist 
industry did not see the great business opportunity in the invention. They felt reluctant 
to risk mass production and worldwide distribution, and did not even support the 
extension of its patent protection. The inventor was not allowed to take the marketing of 
his intellectual product in his own hands. At the end, a Japanese firm ‘reinvented’ it, and 
it was first there that the innovative process of mass introduction developed.18 
 
After these sad stories of frustrated inventors, we turn to the innovation phase. Surely, 
even in the socialist system many individuals had entrepreneurial talent, but it was 
dormant. Perhaps a large project’s leader could to a certain extent unfold his talent, 
provided that he was picked for his position because of his abilities and not his party 
connections. Still, the inherent characteristics of the system did not allow the 
development of a Schumpeterian-type entrepreneurship.19 Let us return, one by one, to 
the conditions reviewed earlier when discussing capitalism, and study the situation 
under the socialist system. 
 
Centralization, bureaucratic commands and permissions. The plan of technical 
innovation is one chapter in the state plan. The central planners set key changes to be 
carried out regarding the composition and the quality, together with the production 
technology, of the products. What follows is the disaggregation of the central plan 
numbers into plans for sectors, sub-sectors, and in the end to companies. The ‘command 
economy’ among others means that firms receive detailed orders about when they 
should replace one product with a new one, and which old machinery or technology 
should be replaced with a new one. Before the final approval of the plan, company 
managers are allowed to make suggestions, so among other things they can initiate the 
adaptation of a new product or a new technology, that is to say, they can join in the 
process of innovation diffusion. However, they must ask for permission to realize all 
significant initiatives. If an action happens to be of large scale, even their immediate 
superiors cannot decide by themselves, but turn to the higher levels of the hierarchy for 
                                                 
18 The Hungarian inventor is still alive. Since his retirement he has been living on a very modest pension. 
See the story of the floppy in Kovács (1999) and Drávucz (2004).  
19 For empirical studies see the references in Footnote 6. For a theoretical explanation, see Berliner 
(1976); Gomulka (1983); Kornai (1980, 1992).   14
approval. The more extensive an initiative is, the higher one has to go for the final 
decision, and the longer the bureaucratic process preceding the actual action is.20  
 
As opposed to the above, if in capitalism a very promising innovation is rejected by the 
first company, another one may be willing to embrace it – made possible by 
decentralization, private property and the market. In the centralized socialist economies 
the innovative idea follows the official pathways, and in case of a declared negative 
decision no appeal can be made. 
 
No or only insignificant reward. If the higher authority deems a technical innovation in 
a factory unit successful, the manager and perhaps his immediate colleagues receive a 
bonus, an amount equal to one or two months of salary at best. 
 
There is no competition between producers and sellers.21 Production is strongly 
concentrated. Quite many companies enjoy monopolist positions, or at least a (regional) 
monopoly in producing an entire group of products. The chronic shortage of products 
creates a monopolist behaviour even where many producers operate in parallel. The 
shortage economy, one of the strongest system-specific properties of socialism, 
paralyzes the forceful engine of innovation, the incentive to fight for the favours of the 
customer (Kornai 1970, 1980, 1992: Chapters 11-12.) The producer/seller is not 
compelled to attract the buyer by offering him a new and better product, since the latter 
is happy to get anything in the shop, even an obsolete and poor-quality product. There 
are examples of inventions activities motivated by chronic shortages: ingeniously 
created substitutes for missing materials or machinery parts (Laki 1984-1985.) These 
results of the inventors’ creative mind, however, do not become widespread, 
commercially successful innovations in the Schumpeterian sense.22 
 
The tight limits of experimenting. Capitalism allows for hundreds or thousands of barren 
or barely fruitful attempts so that, eventually, one will succeed. In the socialist planned 
economy actors are inclined to avoid risks. As a result, the application of revolutionarily 
significant innovations are more or less excluded, since those always mean a leap into 
the dark, as success is necessarily unpredictable. As far as followers are concerned, 
some economies follow up quickly, others slowly. The socialist economies belong to the 
group characterized by the slowest pace. They rather maintain the already known, old 
production procedures, and produce the old well-tried products—new technologies and 
new products have too many uncertain characteristics making the planning of the 
directives difficult. 
 
There is no capital waiting to be utilized, investment allocation is rigid. Central 
planning is not dealing miserly with the resources devoted to capital formation. The 
share of investment carved out from the total output is typically higher than in the 
capitalist economies. However, this enormous volume is appropriated ahead of time to 
the last penny. Moreover, most of the time, over-allocation takes place. In other words, 
                                                 
20 For a powerful theoretical analysis of the relationship between centralization and innovation, see Qian 
and Xu (1998).  
21 As mentioned before, the defense industry was an exception, because in this area the Soviet empire 
was in a truly fierce competition with the West.  
22 Not only did the socialist system suffer from chronic shortages. During wars shortages occur in 
capitalist economies as well. During the Second World War the shortage of raw materials spurred 
innovating activities to develop ‘Ersatz’ (substitute) raw materials.   15
the ensemble of all project plans prescribes the requisition of more resources than the 
required amount to execute the plan. It never happens that unallocated capital is waiting 
for someone with a good idea. The allocators do not search for an entrepreneur waiting 
to step forward with a proposal for innovation. Flexible capital markets are unknown. 
Instead, the rigid and bureaucratic regulation of project activities takes place. And to 
devote capital resources to activities with possibly uncertain outcomes is inconceivable. 
No foolish minister of industry or factory manager will be found who would demand 
money for ventures admitting in advance that the money may be wasted and the 
innovation may not succeed.23 
 
At this point, it is worth running through points A to E again about the description of the 
mechanisms of innovation in these points are actually the consequences of the basic 
characteristics of the capitalist and the socialist systems. The reviewed phenomena are 
direct results of private property and market co-ordination in one system and of public 
property and bureaucratic co-ordination in the other. 
 
I do not claim that a country’s pace of technical progress solely depends on its being 
governed by a capitalist or a socialist system. Numerous other factors play significant 
roles: the country’s state of economic development, the level of education, including the 
training of researchers, the level and the institutional framework of financing academic 
research and industrial R&D activity, research financed by the military and so on. Luck 
undeniably also plays a role. It was a matter of luck why it was in Finland, and not in 
Denmark or Norway, where a company like Nokia has appeared and reached 
unparalleled success in the diffusion of mobile phones. Following the pioneering work 
by Zwi Griliches (1957) there is rich recent literature discussing the problems of 
diffusion, leaders and followers in the innovation process (see, e.g. Davila et al. 2006; 
Freeman 1982; Rogers 1995).24 Admitting the relevance of all other explanatory 
factors, I maintain the proposition: the system-specific effect is quite strong.25 
2.5  Political factors and technical progress 
The decisive factor explaining the nature of the innovative process is the influence of 
the system-specific features of the economy, which is, of course, ultimately determined 
by the political structure of the system. There are, however, several direct linkages 
between the political structure and technical progress. I will briefly touch upon a few 
linkages. 
 
Communist dictatorship aggressively promoted innovations in the information-
communication sphere when it provided efficient technology for political propaganda 
                                                 
23 For the analysis of the relationship between flexibility of financing, centralization and innovation see 
Huang and Xu (1998). 
24 Rogers (1995) is perhaps the most quoted work in the literature written for businessmen and managers 
interested in the practical issues of innovation. In this otherwise excellent and very carefully written book 
the name Schumpeter is not even mentioned, nor is any other economic theory of innovation.  
25 The experience of the divided Germany is especially instructive. East Germany, beside 
Czechoslovakia, was the most developed country in the socialist region. It started with an excellent 
research infrastructure and devoted resources generously to higher education, academic and industrial 
research. Yet it was not able to step forward with even one break-through revolutionary innovation. In 
spite of having first-rate, highly skilled experts at disposal, the rate of following the pioneering 
innovations was in most sectors slower than in West Germany (Bauer 1999; Stokes 2000).      16
and more generally, the spreading of the official ideology. Lenin was among the first 
political leaders to understand the relevance of the cinema for propaganda purposes. 
Also, the USSR was among the first countries to introduce television broadcasting, 
since it was a highly centralized medium in the first period, concentrated in a single or 
only a few studios, and subject to the tough political control of the Party. Also, the 
program of the radio stations could be easily controlled, and transmitted through 
loudspeakers even to remote villages. 
 
Radio and television were supported by the communist regime as long as tough central 
control was feasible. Luckily, as the IC technology developed further, complete 
centralization and censorship became technically impossible. The Berlin Wall stopped 
people from crossing between the two worlds, but no wall could stop radio and TV 
waves transmitting through the Iron Curtain from West Germany to East Germany, 
from Munich to the whole Eastern Europe, no matter how much they tried to jam 
transmissions to try to stop the destabilizing impact of Western broadcasts. Among the 
certainly numerous factors leading to the collapse of the socialist system one was the 
technical impossibility of airtight isolation of the Soviet Union and other socialist 
countries from the voice coming from the rest of the world. 
 
The last turmoil in the socialist block occurred in the period when Xerox machines, 
email and the internet became available even in this area. Gorbachev called for 
‘glaznosty’, (openness), and through the open doors of the internet, email, radio and TV 
waves information flowed from abroad, and later also from open-minded awaking 
domestic citizens in ever larger volume. It had a devastating effect on old dogmas, 
frozen beliefs, misleading party propaganda, liberating the minds of more and more 
people (Shane 1994; Kedzie 1997a, 1997b; Stolyarov 2008). Let me come back to the 
relationship between political structure and technical progress at a later point.
 
2.6  First summary: systems and technical progress  
Assume for a moment that the vision of Marx, Lenin and Trotsky had materialized, the 
world-revolution was victorious all over the globe, without a spot of capitalism left. In 
such a case we would never get the computer and the transistor radio, the refrigerator 
and the supermarket, the internet and the escalator, CD and DVD, digital photography, 
the mobile phone and all the other revolutionary technical changes. Our way of life, at 
least with respect to the use of various devices and equipment, would more or less 
stagnate at the standard taken over from the last spots of capitalism before its final 
defeat.  
 
We arrive here at fundamental issues of understanding and explaining the long-lasting 
trends of human history. The technologies (instruments, devices, equipments etc.) 
utilized in all activities (not only in production of goods, but in all other individual and 
social activities) are developed in a complex social process. That complex process is 
what we call concisely ‘technical progress’. The speed and other properties of technical 
progress are determined by several factors. The general philosophy underlying this 
study (and my other writings) is the following: one of the strongest explanatory factors 
is the system. A strong causal relationship is working between the type of system 
(capitalism or socialism) as one of the causes, and the speed and other properties of 
technical progress as the effect.     17
 
I am using the concept ‘technical progress’ generally accepted by the whole economic 
profession. We must be aware that the second word, ‘progress’ has an appreciative or 
even laudatory sound, as it reflects a value judgment: it is better to live in a world with 
automatic dishwashers, mobile phones and CDs than in a world without those products. 
But is it really better? Nobody, even the most enthusiastic fans of modern technology 
would reply with a simple ‘yes’ without qualifications and reservations. Since the 
invention of the fire and the knife all new instruments and technologies have been used 
for both good and evil purposes. It is a trivial, but still extremely important, fact of life 
that the latest great wave of technical progress, namely the stormy development in the 
sphere of computers, electronics, digital instruments, modern technologies of 
information and communication can serve criminals, sex offenders, terrorists, and 
extremist political movements, also opening the new technology for tricky 
advertisement misleading or at least bothering people. The substitution of the work of 
human beings by robots can lead to the ‘dehumanization’ of various activities and 
contacts. Sitting in front of the screen of the computer or TV day and night can distract 
children and adults from more worthy studies and entertainment. Technical progress has 
been and will be used not only for peaceful, but also for military activities, and not only 
for the defence of the homeland but for aggression as well. Yet, the majority of people, 
myself included, call the direction of technical changes progress,  because it brings 
more, many more benefits than drawbacks or dangers (find survey results to prove this 
to be the majority’s opinion below).  
 
Based on this value judgment I regard the promoting impact of capitalism on technical 
progress as one of the greatest virtues of that system, and the retarding impact of 
socialism on technical progress as one of the greatest vices of that other system. This 
observation alone could be a good reason to celebrate the fall of the socialist system. 
3  Transformation and the acceleration of technical progress 
Entering the world of capitalism, all post-socialist countries opened the door for 
entrepreneurship, path-breaking innovations, the fast diffusion of new products and new 
technologies. The change in basic features of the economy has created the conditions for 
the acceleration of technical progress in this part of the world. 
 
When formulating the above sentences I tried to be cautious. Capitalism has a built-in 
tendency for entrepreneurship, innovation and dynamism. However, this is just a 
tendency, an inclination, a disposition—and not more than that. It is not like a law of 
physics, which must materialize. The earlier section discussing innovation under 
capitalism underlines that beside the decisive impact of system-specific factors, other 
circumstances also exert a significant influence. The diversity of these other, non-
system-specific factors explains the differences in the speed of the innovative process 
between various transition economies. As entrepreneurship, innovation and dynamism 
come to life through human action, it is the social, political and legal environment 
created by human beings that influences how far and how quickly the tendency breaks 
through. It depends on the business climate. And it depends to a large extent on the 
courage, inspiration and competence of individuals who might become entrepreneurs.    18
3.1  New innovative entrepreneurs 
Let us start with innovations introducing revolutionary new products. The first example 
is Skype, listed among the great revolutionary innovations in Table 1. Its two inventors 
are Scandinavian, Niklas Zennström is Swedish and Janus Friis is Danish, but the 
company launching the worldwide distribution was founded and is registered in Estonia. 
Therefore, following the criteria applied in this study, it is an Estonian innovation. It 
was so successful that the USA-based e-Bay paid almost €2 billion for the pioneering 
company when it took over and continued the innovative process. 
 
The second, less spectacular, but still remarkable example is the story of the Hungarian 
high-tech company Graphisoft. The inventor-innovator, Gábor Bojár, a former senior 
fellow in an academic research institute, created a programme for three-dimensional 
design targeted for utilization mainly by architects (Bojár 2007). While not unique in 
the field, compared to other products his software is elegant, efficient and therefore 
commercially successful in several countries. Bojár’s company is marketing the product 
worldwide. This is a classical example of a Schumpeterian entrepreneurial career. What 
a difference there is between the stories of the two Hungarians: floppy disk inventor 
Jánosi not succeeding in the pre-1989 era, remaining poor and virtually unknown, and 
Graphisoft creator Bojár reaching fame, reputation and a big fortune. 
 
The third story about data-recovery from damaged computer hard disks starts also in 
Kádár-era Hungary, characterized by half-way market reforms. At the time there were 
quite a few computers around, but were rather expensive for the Hungarian 
environment. If a computer breaks down, the most valuable part, the hard drive, should 
not be dumped as it worthwhile restoring it for use in another computer. Two brothers, 
János and Sándor Kürti acquired special skills for the restoration of hard drives. And 
then came the creative idea: restoring data from damaged hard disks. Mostly everybody 
these days knows the traumatic feeling of losing important information and files on our 
computers. The Kürtis learnt the technique, or more precisely the art, of conjuring data 
believed to be lost forever from damaged disks. As after 1989 this very special 
knowledge became a marketable service, the Kürti brothers founded a company, and 
trained several experts in their technique. They have now customers all over the world 
(Kürti and Fabiányi 2008; Laki 2009), making theirs another story of the highly 
successful Schumpeterian innovators. 
 
Though two out of the three examples come from Hungary, due to my personal 
connections to people familiar with those cases, I am convinced that there are similar 
stories in many other post-socialist countries.  
3.2  The acceleration of follow-up and diffusion 
As post-socialist economies were moving forward in enlarging the private sector and 
creating the institutions of market co-ordination, technical progress accelerated in many 
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Table 5: Telephone lines: comparative data (number of lines per 1000 people) 
Year Bulgaria  Hungary  Poland  Romania  Soviet  Union  Germany Greece  Italy 
1979  91 53 53 67 67  308  226  216 
1980  102  58 55 73 70  332  235  231 
1985  167  70 67 88 103  416  314  305 
1990  242  96 86 102  140  441  384  387 
1995  305 210 148 131 169  514 494 434 
2000  353 372 283 174 218  610 536 474 
2005  323 332 307 203 280  661 567 431 
Source: United Nations Statistics Division (2009). 
Table 6: Penetration of modern communication technology in EU countries: 
15 old EU member states (EU15) versus 10 new post-socialist member states (EU10) 
Indicator  Unit of measurement  Group  1995  2001  2007 
GDP 
per capita  
constant 2000 US$ 
EU15  19,706 23,747 26,781 
EU10 3,469 4,425 6,295 
GDP 
per capita, PPP  
constant 2005 US$ 
EU15  25,831 31,134 35,058 
EU10 9,758 12,286  17,570 
Personal computers  Per 100 people 
EU15  16 35 37 
EU10 3  12  33 
Internet users  Per 100 people 
EU15 3  32  64 
EU10 1  14  48 
Broadband 
subscribers 
Per 100 people 
EU15 NA  2  24 
EU10 NA  0  12 
Mobile phone 
subscriptions 
Per 100 people 
EU15 7  77  116 
EU10 1  40  118 
Notes: Figures are simple means for each country group. For missing data (NA); see source for details. 
Source: World Bank (2008). 
 
Access to a telephone line has been regarded self-evident to everyone in the West in the 
last decades. But not in the least so for citizens of socialist countries, where it was a 
service in very short supply, reserved for the privileged and provided for others only 
after a waiting period of several years. There were not enough lines, because planners 
assigned them a low priority, and allocated resources to other sectors. As long as 
socialism prevailed it seemed to be hopeless to change the relationship of supply and 
demand in telephone service. Then followed the change of the system and together with 
it the situation completely reversed in the telephone sector. Table 5 shows that in a 
relatively short time old-style cable phone service became accessible to everyone. In 
addition, a revolutionary new product, the mobile phone appeared and conquered the 
phone market26 (see Tables 6, 7, and 8). The penetration of these services occurred in 
stormy speed (Cooper 2009). As the use of the phone has become unconstrained on the 
supply side, nowadays only the demand constraint is effective. 
                                                 
26 In some countries, e.g. in Hungary, it has not only stopped the further increase of cable-connected 
phone service, but has actually started to replace it in many households.   20
Table 7: Penetration of modern communication technology in EU countries (five 
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S3  3  12 40 74 88 100  115 
V5  1  4  14 46 72 92 113 
Notes: Figures are simple averages for each country group. V5 = Visegrád countries: the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia; S3 =  South European countries: Greece, Portugal and Spain.  
Source: World Bank (2008). 
The clear causal relationship between capitalism and the abundant supply of the phone 
service is present on several levels. The transition to private ownership based on the 
liberalized market economy put an end to the shortage economy. Phone service is 
supplied because domestic or foreign entrepreneurs profit from this business. Because 
of the close substitutability of the cable-connected telephone by mobile phones the first 
one cannot remain a monopoly. On the contrary, we witness a fierce rivalry between 
phone companies. Thirty years ago in the Soviet Union or in Eastern Europe the would-
be-customer begged the bureaucracy for the great favour of getting a phone line. 
Nowadays phone companies are bidding for the favour of the customer.  
 
I, for one, remember well my own troubles due to the lack of a phone line in my home, 
and am grateful that due to post-socialist transition and capitalism I now have a phone at 
home, as do all members of my family. I am grateful for the improved chances of 
technical progress due to the change of the system. I know that ‘gratitude’ is a word 
missing from the vocabulary of economics and political science. Yet, I want to use 
exactly that term because it clearly reflects not only my rational understanding of a 
positive causal relationship between capitalism and innovation in general, and the shift 
toward capitalism and the availability of phone services in particular, but also a strong 
emotion toward the post-1989 changes. In spite of all shortcomings and lost battles, I 
genuinely celebrate the anniversary and it is one of the important reasons to celebrate 
the advent of capitalism that all the products of technical progress are finally available 
also for us, the citizens of the post-socialist region. 
 
   21





Country 1995  2001  2007 
GDP  per capita, US$ 
Russia 1,618  1,870  2,858 
Brazil 3,611 3,696 4,222 
Mexico 4,892  5,864  6,543 
GDP  per capita, PPP 
Russia 7,853  9,076  13,873 
Brazil 7,727 7,910 9,034 
Mexico 9,949  11,927 13,307 
Personal computers  per 100 people 
Russia 2  8  NA 
Brazil 2  6  NA 
Mexico 3  7  NA 
Internet users  per 100 people 
Russia 0  3  21 
Brazil 0  5  35 
Mexico 0  7  23 
Broadband subscribers  per 100 people 
Russia NA  0  3 
Brazil NA  0  4 
Mexico NA  0  4 
Mobile phone 
subscriptions 
per 100 people 
Russia 0  5  115 
Brazil 1  16  63 
Mexico 1  22  63 
Source: World Bank (2008). 
 
 
Tables 6, 7, and 8 show similar results for quite a few other, not less important, 
diffusion processes: the use of computers, access to the internet and so on. The speed of 
following the pioneering countries has accelerated quite spectacularly.  
 
Numerous entrepreneurs take the example of a pioneer, adapt the idea to the actual local 
circumstances and achieve great successes. One of these Schumpeterian great 
innovators is the Chinese businessman Ma Yun, the founder and leader of the Alibaba 
Group. The main activity of the companies belonging to his group is the business-to-
business trade over the internet, especially trading between small companies. The 
Alibaba Group is now the largest company of that sector in China, and one of the largest 
in the world. Ma Yun started as a high school teacher, and became a multi-billionaire.27 
(The story of Alibaba is a spectacular success story, but hundreds of other impressive 
innovation stories have evolved in the post-socialist world. To sum up, the gap between 
the most developed countries and the post-socialist countries has not disappeared, but is 
narrower now, in contrast to the socialist era when the gap was typically increasing over 
time.28 
                                                 
27 See www.alibaba.com (company information).   
28 According to the Information Society Index, reflecting the development of various aspects of   
’information society’ in a synthetic way, several post-socialist countries, e.g. the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, and Slovenia, have achieved a decent position in the ranking (Karvalics 2009). The whole group 
of countries observed is moving ahead, and is getting higher values each year, though it takes strong 
efforts just to hold the rank achieved today.   22
3.3 Creative  destruction 
The process of innovation and the dynamics of firms’ entry and exit are closely 
associated. Schumpeter coined the name ‘creative destruction’ for the latter, describing 
concisely and precisely the two inseparable sides of fast technical progress. It is easy to 
appreciate happy arrivals to the business world, especially if they appear in the form of 
successful innovators. But there is no fast progress without the sad events of 
bankruptcies, business failure, exits, and the accompanying bitter phenomena of lay-offs 
and unemployment. 
 
Transition economies have had the bad fortune of experiencing two big waves of 
creative destruction. I called the first one ‘transformational recession’ in an earlier paper 
(Kornai 1993). It caused trauma in all post-socialist countries, leading to a huge number 
of exits and creating the first shock of mass unemployment after decades of over-
employment and job security. The present recession is not yet over, but—looking with 
some degree of optimism into the near future—it will probably lead to a smaller fall of 
production than the decline of output under the transformational recession. That was 
probably one of the deepest recessions in economic history, but the world paid less 
attention to it than to the present crisis because only we, the citizens of the former 
communist region, were the victims of the transformational recession, and the rest of the 
world did not share the painful experience. 
Figure 2: Firms’ entry and exit rates in the 1990s 
 
Note: Columns in blue show the entry rates, defined as the number of new firms divided by the total 
number of incumbent and entrant firms in a given year. Columns in purple show the exit rates, defined as 
the number of firms exiting the market in a given year divided by the population of origin, i.e. the 
incumbents in the previous year. 
Source: Bartelsman et al. (2004: 16, panel C). 
 
The transformational recession carried a dreadfully high price tag of suffering, but it 
created benefits as well. It compelled quick adjustments to a radical shift in the 
composition of the internal and external market, and also cleared the way to more 
dynamism, more innovation and higher productivity. Many obsolete production lines, 
smoky and rusty factories, and poorly supplied shops disappeared and brand new 
production units located in modern buildings equipped with the latest technology, and   23
new supermarkets and shopping centres appeared. Well-organized data are available on 
entry and exit in the post-socialist area. The paper by Bartelsman et al. (2004) provides 
a careful report and analysis, based on firm-level data, of the process of creative 
destruction across 24 countries, including several transition countries: Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Romania and Slovenia. We present here only one diagram for the sake of 
illustration (see Figure 2), covering firms with at least 20 employees in the 1990s.   
 
In the first years of transition the number of entries was much larger than the number of 
exits, which was different from more mature market economies where the difference of 
these two flows is usually smaller, or is negative. Many large (formerly state-owned) 
companies went out of business, and small business entered in huge numbers. Total firm 
turnover (exit + entry rate) was between 3 and 8 per cent in most industrial countries, 
and more than 10 per cent in some of the transition economies in the 1990s.  
Figure 3: The evolution of gross and net firm flows in transition economies 
 
Note: The calculations cover the whole business sector. The black line shows the total turnover (entry rate 
plus exit rate), the red line the net flow (entry rate minus exit rate.) 
Source: Bartelsman et al. (2004: 17, Figure 2, panel B). 
 
The turbulence caused by the fast turnover and short life-span of newly created firms 
later calmed down. By the end of the 1990s the characteristic demographic data of the 
firm-population came fairly close to those observed in other countries. Figure 3 shows 
the trend towards a more balanced ratio between entry and exit. The red line is 
approaching the zero position, where the numbers of employee-weighted entry and exit 
rates cancel each other out. It took several years to get over the worst phase of the 
destructive side of the Schumpeterian process. Post-socialist economies started to grow 
with increased efficiency, producing a much more up-to-date output-mix, when 
suddenly a new external shock, the impact of the global recession shook the economy. 
The people of our region are going through the second painful recession. It is quite 
understandable that nowadays the word ‘capitalism’ does not resonate nicely in the ears 
of the citizens of post-socialist countries. 
 
It is too early to ask the question whether the present recession—beside causing 
disturbance and suffering—has a cleansing effect in the Schumpeterian sense. Does the   24
destruction clear the way for more construction in the post-socialist region? Ten or more 
years from now will provide sufficient evidence to answer that question. It would 
require a separate long study to discuss the policy implications of the positive 
description provided above. What I can do here is just offer a few hints at policy options 
and the dilemmas associated with the choice between the options. 
 
1.  Accepting the basic Schumpeterian idea of creative destruction does not imply 
an automatic approval of all specific manifestations of destruction. If the blind 
market forces lead to the exit of a firm, some organizations (the central or local 
government, the financial sector or some other entities) might consider a bail-
out. Here we are in the middle of a huge area of theoretical and practical 
problems discussed in the literature on the soft budget constraint and moral 
hazard. I have discussed this issue in several papers (Kornai et al. 2003; Kornai 
2009). At this point I want to add only one remark: the Schumpeterian process 
of innovation is accompanied by the spectacularly rapid growth of exactly the 
sectors and sub-sectors which are the most promising and most ‘fashionable’ 
(remember the mass entry and stormy growth of ‘dot-com’ firms). This process 
inevitably has two sides: many projects are needed for the few great successes, 
and at the same time we get too many of them. But then ‘natural selection’ 
follows, and we must not fight for the survival of each species destined for 
extinction. Policymakers might rally strong arguments in favour of certain bail-
outs, e.g. to protect the economy as a whole from far-reaching serious 
macroeconomic damage caused by excessive numbers of exits. However, the 
counter-arguments must be also carefully considered.  
 
2.  The debate about the causes of the recent recession is going on. A well-known 
train of thought refers to the easy-going lending policy of the financial sector 
and is calling for much more rigorous, more conservative lending rules in the 
future. I do not refuse this line of thinking, but I must add a warning. The 
Schumpeterian process of innovation requires relatively easy access to capital 
for risky projects which might fail, or might lead to the fantastic achievements of 
technical progress (see conditions D and E in the above survey of circumstances 
necessary for enfolding the Schumpeterian process of innovation). The general 
mood calls for caution and stronger risk-aversion than before the recession. I 
agree, more caution is needed than before but it would be a fatal mistake to 
apply a very conservative attitude blindly. Lending criteria should be carefully 
differentiated so as to leave the chances for financing risky but promising 
innovative projects open.  
 
3.  We hear loud calls for regulation and warnings against the unfettered rule of 
market forces. These calls and warnings are legitimate, up to a certain limit. 
Beyond that we might enter the area of over-regulation, the bureaucratic 
obstacles to starting businesses, which can dampen the vigour of the 
entrepreneurial spirit. Moreover, in quite a few post-socialist countries it is still a 
difficult obstacle race to start a business (see the report of the World Bank and 
the International Finance Corporation (2009) Doing Business). Policymakers 
should avoid both types of mistake; going too far in deregulation, or introducing 
too much (and/or ill-targeted) regulation. 
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4.  The public mood is upset because of sky-rocketing earnings of many business 
people and top managers. We hear calls for practical measures against this 
phenomenon. Though the anger is morally justified and psychologically 
understandable, nevertheless an (unpopular) caveat is needed. One of the 
conditions of the Schumpeterian process (condition B in the above listing) is the 
gigantic reward in the case of success. Not simply a large, but a huge reward. 
That does encourage the would-be innovators to take the large risk of failure. Let 
us remember that in this context not only the first pioneers of introducing the 
great break-through inventions deserve the name ‘innovators’, but also the 
entrepreneurs quick in following the (domestic or foreign) pioneers. On the other 
hand, how difficult it is to imagine the work of an honest and competent jury 
able to draw the line between a well-deserved and an undeserved high reward. I 
am not prepared to propose a feasible procedure, just want to draw the attention 
to the two (mutually contradictory) aspects of very high business income. 
4.  Reflection of historical reality in people’s minds 
4.1  The basic phenomenon: lack of understanding 
In the previous parts of the study I described the historical reality of the interaction 
between the Great Transformation, i.e. the change of the system, and technical progress. 
Allowing for errors in the description, I am convinced about its basic accuracy, 
supported by sufficient evidence. We have to separate the description of historical 
reality and the reflection of that reality in people’s minds. The reflexive process works 
differently in different people. The reality described in the earlier sections is perceived, 
understood and evaluated differently by each individual, depending on his/her social 
status, education, personal history and character.  
Table 9: Evaluation of technical progress 
 Scientific  and 
technological 
progress will help to 
cure diseases such 
as AIDS, cancer, etc. 
Thanks to science and 
technology, there will 
be greater 
opportunities for future 
generations 
Science and 
technology make our 




technology will help 
eliminate poverty and 
hunger around the 
world 
The benefits of 
science are 
greater than the 
harmful effects it 
could have 
AT  82 71  71 33 48 
FIN  89 77  77 21 50 
IT  82 73  76 50 57 
SP  79 66  73 37 57 
PL  89 93  83 45 65 
HU  94 81  79 34 63 
CZ  85 74  70 35 44 
Note: The following question was asked, ‘do you agree with the following statements?’. The table shows 
the proportions of positive answers in % of the total number of respondents.  
Source: Eurobarometer (2005). 
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The first question we must raise is about the evaluation of technical progress. Do people 
regard the past and future appearance of inventions and innovations, new products and 
new technologies as advancement or are they afraid of the process and regard it as 
harmful or dangerous? The question has been asked in some international surveys; 
Tables 9 and 10 give us interesting insights. Considering benefits and harms caused by 
technical progress, two thirds of Polish and Hungarian respondents find the positive 
effect stronger than the negative. In that respect a larger proportion of citizens of these 
two post-socialist countries are in favour of technical progress than in Austria, Finland, 
Italy and Spain, and in the post-socialist Czech Republic. The proportion of respondents 
approving technical progress is much higher when the question is about the future 
impact (see the fifth column of Table 9 and the first column of Table 10). 
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EU15  47  90 85  63  77  67 90  79 
EU10  72  84 87  64  81  70 86  79 
Germany  75  95 89  65  75  57 92  72 
UK  82  91 92  65  81  61 90  80 
Hungary  82  87 87  74  78  67 81  75 
Poland  91  89 92  63  86  80 88  88 
Romania  83  78 86  65  82  75 84  85 
Note: The following question was asked, ‘do you think the following new technologies will have positive 
negative or neutral effects?’. Only the proportions of positive answers are shown.  
Source: Eurobarometer (2005). 
 
The second question aims not at the evaluation but causality. I take the risk and start 
with a bold general conjecture. The large majority of citizens in the post-socialist region 
do not understand the basic causal relationship between capitalism and technological 
progress. Although the innovations of the last 50-100 years, and in particular the 
revolutionary change of information and communication technology, has dramatically 
changed everyone’s life, and most people enjoy the advantages of fast technological 
change, they do not attribute this great change to capitalism.29 On the contrary. A large 
part of the population has moderate or even vehement anti-capitalist feelings—while 
taking advantage of the mobile phone, the internet, the bar code in the supermarket, the 
plastic materials and synthetic fibres, the modern household appliances, the Xerox 
copier and so on and so on, without acknowledging that all of them, without exception, 
are creations of the despised or hated capitalist system. That is a conjecture. And to my 
regret I cannot refer to one single survey, public opinion pool or value survey 
supporting, correcting or refusing that conjecture.30 Among the hundreds of more or 
                                                 
29 In an earlier section, talking about the shortage of telephone lines under socialism and the abundant 
supply after 1989, I made a subjective remark: I am grateful to capitalism for this change in my life. 
Perhaps I am not the only one who has this feeling, but I am afraid, we are a small minority. 
30 With the help of my assistant Dániel Róna, we tried to check the most respected surveys carefully. We 
checked the four best-known transnational surveys looking for the question formulated above in the text   27
less relevant questions asked from the informants, nobody ever asked in any form the 
question formulated here: what do you think and how do you feel about the interaction 
between the overall system (capitalism, socialism, transition from socialism to 
capitalism) on the one hand, and technical progress, on the other?  
 
Let me maintain the conjecture until we get the first survey data providing a reliable 
insight in people’s minds concerning these questions and the results call for the 
modification of the conjecture. The lack of surveys seems, in some strange way, an 
indirect support of my conjecture. If professional researchers studying the 
understanding of social change and people’s sentiments vis-á-vis the changes 
completely ignore this set of questions then what can we expect from the average 
citizen? The complete lack of surveys related to these vital issues is a clear indication of 
intellectual indifference toward the understanding of the relationship between the 
political and economic sphere and the acceleration of technical progress. Public opinion 
is shaped by a complex social process. Everyone is taking part, the parents and the 
teachers in the kindergarten and the primary school, our neighbour at home and our 
colleague at the workplace. I would make a few remarks about professional groups 
carrying special responsibility for shaping public opinion. 
4.2  The responsibility of the economic profession 
What do we teach to students? The exciting and important new current of growth 
theory, inspired to a large extent by Schumpeter (Aghion 1998; Grossman and Helpman 
1991), is acknowledged by the rest of the profession, and usually respect is expressed in 
a polite footnote but without profoundly penetrating the way of thinking in mainstream 
economics. Highly distinguished economists (Baumol et al. 2007; Phelps 2008: 77-98) 
put a heavy emphasis on entrepreneurship in explaining the virtues of capitalism. The 
recent representatives of the Austrian school (see e.g. Kirzner 1985: 119-49) never get 
tired of drawing attention to the innovative nature of spontaneous market forces. 
Economists specializing in comparative economics and the study of socialist and post-
socialist economies draw the attention to the strong causal relationship between the 
specific properties of a system and the characteristics of technical progress; an excellent 
example is in Balcerowicz (1995: Chapter 6). Nevertheless, these valuable ideas do not 
penetrate, via a large number of courses on microeconomics, serving the routine 
education of young economists. 
 
There is a simple, but decisive test: let us check the most influential introductory 
textbooks. Take Gregory Mankiw’s (2009) textbook, which is one of the most widely 
used texts in the USA, and is also translated into several languages. It is used as a 
textbook in my country, Hungary, as well. It is a masterpiece in didactics, well-written, 
full of interesting illustrations of the main propositions. Yet not a single sentence on the 
Schumpeterian innovative process can be found! There are several dozen names in the 
index, but Schumpeter’s name does not appear. There are a few pallid paragraphs about 
the increase of factor productivity and technical progress, but that does not compensate 
                                                                                                                                               
and did not find anything resembling the content of that question. The results of these surveys are on 
record and available from the author.     28
for the lack of the vivid description of the innovative process and the profound 
explanation of the dynamism of capitalism.31 
 
Let me add a few reservations. I focus here only on introductory texts, because they 
play a crucial role in the formation of the thinking of students, they do the ‘imprinting’ 
of the conditional reflexes and automatisms of the thought process. 
 
Above appear the names of distinguished economists who are perfectly aware of the 
role of entrepreneurship and the Schumpeterian approach. If these scholars (and quite a 
few others accepting a similar view of the capitalist economy) are teaching 
microeconomics, they certainly do not ignore the explanation of the innovative process 
and the role of the capitalist system in generating break-through innovations.32 Our 
small sample is, of course, not representative. It is beyond the limits of my present 
research and this study to analyze a large and representative sample of textbooks and 
draw the appropriate conclusions. But until I do not meet well-substantiated refusal, I 
maintain the hypothesis claiming that a large (probably dominant) part of the higher 
education introducing the students to the principles of economics does not explain this 
highly important system-specific property of capitalism sufficiently. 
 
Mainstream economics is often accused of advertising the favourable properties of 
capitalism. If so, it is doing a rather poor job in teaching, lacking the mention of one of 
the main virtues of the system, its inclination toward unstoppable stormy innovation. 
 
The GDP has become the dominant indicator when it comes to the measurement of 
growth—it is a great achievement of economists and statisticians to have an operational 
definition and methodology for measuring the GDP, uniformly accepted all over the 
world. But this important success has generated some kind of laziness in evaluating the 
successes and failures of the development process. Attention is focused on GDP growth 
rates to an exaggerated extent. Perhaps a few other indicators also get attention: 
inflation, fiscal balance, the current account, measures of inequality, and a few more. 
But there are no widely accepted and regularly observed indicators of measuring 
success or failure, acceleration or slow-down of technical progress—understanding this 
term in the spirit of the present study. Post-socialist economies in Eastern Central 
Europe reached the pre-1990 level of GDP around 1994-2000, and the successor states 
of the Soviet Union even later or are still below that level. Yes, but in the meantime the 
way of life has completely changed for a large part of the population. Here, in the 
context of the present study, I do not refer to the changes in the political environment, 
income distribution and social mobility. Beside all these very important changes, I refer 
to the accelerated use of new products and new technologies in the everyday life of 
people created by the capitalist innovative process. We lament about troubles with the 
level of the GDP, but a large part of the population is now connected to the rest of the 
society by phone and the internet, a much larger number of people have cars and 
                                                 
31 With the help of my research assistant, Judit Hürkecz, we checked seven more popular introductory 
textbooks, widely used in teaching in the USA and Europe, including Hungary and other posts-socialist 
countries. Every remark made on Mankiw’s book applies exactly to six books as well. Out of the small 
sample of eight books , there is only one exception. (I come back to that exception in the next footnote.) 
The list of these textbooks is on record, and available at request from the author. 
32 Small wonder that the exception in our sample is the work of Baumol and Blinder (2009). William 
Baumol is one of the intellectual leaders advocating a Schumpeterian approach in understanding 
capitalism.   29
modern household appliances and use several other new products formerly available for 
people in the West only. We should elaborate appropriate indicators and measurement 
methods in order for the correct observation and demonstration of the effects of 
technical progress on everyday life.  
 
The need to complement the measurement of GDP with other indicators to reflect other 
aspects of welfare and development is well-known to every economist and economic 
statistician. Important new initiatives are enfolding to improve the measurement of 
growth, and are complementing the data on aggregate output with various indicators 
reporting on health, education, income distribution and so on. 33 I am worried that the 
aspect highlighted in this study—the impact of technical progress on the way of life—
may be left out again from the efforts of reforming statistics, and does not get the 
attention it deserves. 
4.3  The responsibility of politicians 
Politicians are, self-evidently, in charge of governmental policy. Everything mentioned 
above with respect to the policy implications of the analysis belongs to the competence 
of political decision makers. Right now, however, I would make a few remarks about 
another aspect of political activity. Political leaders are also educators of their nation. 
 
With the help of a few colleagues, we read some public speeches of political leaders of 
the following countries: Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Serbia, Slovakia and Slovenia. In each country we chose the speeches or writings of the 
head of state and/or the prime minister, furthermore, the leader(s) of the most influential 
opposition party (or parties). We tried to select speeches or written statements offering a 
general overview of the country’s successes and failures (like the State of the Union 
address in the USA) mostly delivered at the occasions of national holidays and events. 
Most of the texts we analyzed were delivered during the first eight months of 2009. In 
some cases we were able to find a speech celebrating the twentieth anniversary of the 
1989 events, and providing an overall evaluation of the post-socialist transition.34  
 
The general finding is easy to summarize. Out of 53 speeches and political statements 
there was not a single one explaining the causal linkage between capitalism and 
technical progress and the impact of this progress on people’s life. This virtue of 
capitalism was not spelled out in order to convince the people that moving from 
socialism to capitalism meant a shift to the world of innovation, modernization and 
dynamism. Some political leaders say a few words about technical progress. The same 
politicians or some others speak favourably about the capitalist system. But we did not 
find the argument just explained in their speeches. The sample of 53 statements is large 
enough to speak out loudly—that is a shocking and disappointing observation. We 
observe here not the conduct of radical anti-capitalist political figures from the extreme 
right or the extreme left, but of leaders of the political ‘establishment’ in Eastern 
Europe. They alternately are in governmental or oppositional position, but they are 
                                                 
33  The President of the French Republic has invited a group of economists and statisticians, chaired by 
Joseph Stiglitz, Amartya Sen and Jean-Paul Fitoussi, to work on new proposals for improving the 
measurement of growth and development. At the moment the group is circulating the first drafts of the 
report (Stiglitz et al. 2009).  
34  The list of documents studied is on record and available from the author.    30
certainly friends and not enemies of capitalism, and yet, they miss one of the best 
arguments in favour of the system. Let us add immediately, very few are ready to take a 
stand for capitalism. It is becoming quite common among politicians (both on the left 
and on the right) to emphasize the dark side of the system, and speak out against it. 
 
Certainly, more political speeches and written statements should be checked. I would 
welcome any additional information, including counter-examples, i.e. speeches 
underlining the role of capitalism in generating innovation, and adding the acceleration 
of technical progress to the list of successes achieved in the era of transition. However, 
as long as it is not refuted, I maintain the proposition: politicians at all points of the 
political spectrum carry heavy responsibility for neglecting the explanation of the causal 
relationship between ‘capitalism→innovation→changes in the way of life’. 
Understanding this crucial linkage would be an effective antidote against anti-capitalist 
sentiments—and our political leaders do not provide that antidote. 
 
Neglect is, of course, the milder sin. What I find most irritating is populist demagoguery 
against capitalism, while making practical use of all the discoveries and innovations 
generated by capitalism. It is morally repulsive to see political activists mobilizing 
people for an extremist anti-capitalist meeting or protest demonstration using a personal 
computer, mobile phones and communication channels provided by satellites and 
optical fibre. That is happening in the post-socialist region. Political activists, denying 
even the simple fact that the change of system has already happened, put their populist 
anti-capitalist slogans on a blog or an internet site, give inflammatory speeches to a mob 
through electronic loudspeakers and communicate with each others via mobile phones, 
thus exploiting the technique generated by capitalism.  
4.4  Interconnectivity and democracy 
While we know practically nothing about the comprehension and evaluation of the 
‘capitalism→innovation→changes in the way of life’ causal linkage in people’s minds, 
we have some insights into the opposite direction of interaction, namely, the effect of 
technical progress (or more precisely, of progress in the information–communication 
sector) on the political views of people in post-socialist countries. Tables 11, 12, and 13 
summarize survey-data on post-socialist area respondents’ attitudes toward democracy, 
capitalism and the former socialist system. In the tabulations presented here the 
population was divided into two classes; people using and not using the internet 
frequently. The difference is quite impressive.35 Those connected to the world of 
modern information technology (IT) hold more favourable views on democracy and 
capitalism, and are more critical of the past regime, which is an encouraging sign. The 
users of the internet are more immune to the sentiments of nostalgia for the old socialist 
order—a feeling strengthened in many, especially since the recent economic crisis. 
 
                                                 
35 We touch here upon a highly relevant question whether the appearance of high-tech communication 
expand social inequality. The search for an answer reaches beyond the limits of the present study.   31
Table 11: Satisfaction with democracy: population divided into users and non-users of 
the internet 
Country 
Internet users    Non-users 
mean %    mean  % 
Central Eastern Europe   2.6  30    2.8  70 
Czech Republic   2.5  42    2.8  57 
Hungary* 2.2  23    2.4  77 
Poland 2.7  34    2.9  66 
Russia 3.0  14    3.1  86 
Slovenia 2.2  57    2.1  43 
Note: In the second (resp. fourth) column the share of users (resp. non-users) of internet. The following 
question was asked, ‘how satisfied are you with the way democracy works’. Answers were expected at a 
4-degree scale: 1 = completely satisfied; 2 = somewhat satisfied; 3 = not very satisfied; 4 = completely 
dissatisfied. The table shows the mean (not weighted). *I have reservations concerning the Hungarian data 
on internet users. The figure seems to be too low compared with other statistics. (JK) 
Source: Rose (2004). 
Table 12: Evaluation of the capitalist economic system: population divided into users 
and non-users of the internet 
Country 
Internet users    Non-users 
mean %    mean % 
Central Eastern Europe   1.9  30    0.4  70 
Czech Republic   2.5  42    0.7  58 
Hungary* 0.7  23   –0.5  77 
Poland 1.1  34    –0.9  66 
Russia 0.9  14    –0.8  86 
Slovenia 1.6  57    0.7  43 
Note: In the second (resp. fourth) column the share of users (resp. non-users) of internet. The following question 
was asked, ‘how satisfied are you with the capitalist system’. Answers were expected at a 21-degree scale: -10 = 
worst, 0 = neutral, +10 = best. The table shows the mean (not weighted.) *I have reservations concerning the 
Hungarian data on internet users. The figure seems to be too low compared with other statistics. (JK) 
Source: Rose (2004). 
Table 13: Evaluation of the socialist economic system: population divided into users 
and non-users of the internet 
Country 
Internet users    Non-users 
mean %    mean % 
Central Eastern Europe   1.1  30    3.7  70 
Czech Republic   –2.6  42    0.6  58 
Hungary* 0.2  23    3.0  77 
Poland –0.4  34    3.4  66 
Russia 1.6  14    4.4  86 
Slovenia 3.0  57    4.0  43 
Note: In the second (resp. fourth) column the share of users (resp. non-users) of internet. The following 
question was asked, ‘how satisfied were you with the former socialist system’. Answers were expected at a 
21-degree scale: -10 = worst, 0 = neutral, +10 = best. The table shows the mean (not weighted.) *I have 
reservations concerning the Hungarian data on internet users. The figure seems to be too low compared 
with other statistics. (JK) 
Source: Rose (2004).   32
 
The empirical results reported above fit well into the findings of another line of studies: 
the research on interconnectivity. The intuitive meaning of the term is clearly indicated 
by the name: individuals are connected to each other by various technical instruments 
and procedures. Email plays a particularly important role in this respect. The more 
people are technically able to send email to others, the tighter the network of 
connections becomes. That phenomenon is certainly observable and measurable. 
 
I rely here on an exciting study by Christopher R. Kedzie (1997a), who refers to a 
metric measuring ‘interconnectivity’. Not being an expert of that field, I cannot judge 
whether the metric used in Kedzie’s study is the best available for the purpose for which 
he is using it. Conditionally accepting his choice, the basic results of his study are 
certainly worth mentioning. He looked, beside other calculations, on the correlation 
between ‘democracy’ (measured by various indicators) and ‘interconnectivity’. This 
correlation turns out to be 0.73, stronger than the correlation of democracy with per 
capita GDP (0.57). I report the proposition with some reservation, due to my lack of 
knowledge in the area utilized by the interconnectivity index. A more recent study by 
Frisch (2003), however, supports Kedzie’s findings. Hopefully, research in that 
direction will continue. 
 
At this point let me recall my earlier remark on the role of modern information-
communication technology in dismantling the monolithic power of the communist party 
and the official Marxist-Leninist ideology. There I looked at events which happened 20 
years ago in the former Soviet Union and in the socialist countries in East Central 
Europe. The problem is, however, not outdated at all. There are two small countries, 
Cuba and North Korea, where not much has changed in the economy, and heavy-handed 
communist dictatorship still prevails. And then there are two large countries, where far-
reaching reforms have been introduced and have moved the economy close to 
capitalism while the political structure has changed very little, remaining a single-party 
dictatorship. How will modern information–communication technology influence those 
countries? China and Vietnam eagerly utilize all advantages provided by the 
revolutionary achievements of technical progress, and at the same time they are scared 
of the consequences. These two objectives of the leadership—maximum gain from 
technical progress and maximum protection of the monopoly of power—diametrically 
contradict each other, resulting in hesitation, steps forward and backward, ambivalence. 
 
Another major problem to analyze is the prospects: what is the future of the interaction 
between the forthcoming waves of innovation and the way of life? On my pessimistic 
days I foresee various evil scenarios. Even without a special talent for prophecy we can 
easily predict the misuse of technical achievements. I read several reports about efforts 
of the Chinese government to apply political censorship of the internet, block the 
transmission of certain TV channels or shut down outspoken blogs.36 Since an ever-
growing share of all computers used in China is produced domestically, it is easy to 
enforce the incorporation of a centrally-controlled censorship software into the 
operation system. Sadly, large Western corporations, scared of losing the huge Chinese 
market, are willing to co-operate with the officials in their efforts to introduce political 
censorship. 
                                                 
36 See Chao (2009) and Timmer (2009) on Chinese efforts to apply political censorship. For a general 
overview see the entry on internet censorship in Wikipedia (2009b).   33
When Orwell wrote his book Nineteen Eighty-Four sixty years ago (Orwell 1949/1950), 
Big Brother did not have the equipment envisaged in the novel. But nowadays there is 
no technical difficulty in installing cameras and listening devices in every flat and 
office. Imagine a future Stalin with the latest gadgets of observation and 
telecommunication, resolved to use it to watch all citizens. But then, on my more 
optimistic days I escape the nightmarish visions and hope that modern technology gives 
birth time and again to decentralization, whatever efforts dictatorships devote to assure 
or even further strengthen centralization. If the centralizator invents a new way of 
blocking information, there will be hundreds and thousands of decentralizators, 
inventive computer users who break through the blockades and barriers.37 
5 Concluding  remarks 
My study has covered a vast array of topics. I did not intend to limit the study to one or 
two issues. We are looking at a huge white area on the otherwise colourful map of 
research in comparative economics and post-socialist ‘transitology’. The purpose of my 
study was to give a general overview of the area.  
 
Among the great number of valuable studies on several topics, some are mentioned in 
my study. Unfortunately, each topic has its own large body of literature but sharply 
separated from each other, lacking cross-references. The emphasis of my study was not 
the detailed description and analysis of one or the other linkage, but to give you an 
impression of the totality of interactions. And there are also dozens of themes deserving 
penetrating research, empirical observation and theoretical analysis, barely touched 
upon or not even mentioned in my study. The study of technical progress and its 
relationship to society is going on in a multi-dimensional space. The points discussed in 
my study are located in a sub-space, and I am aware that there are relevant dimensions 
outside my sub-space.38  
 
                                                 
37 In the last footnote I referred to an article by Timmer (2009) published on the internet. The editor 
asked for comments. Here is the first comment: ‘So what is there to keep Chinese citizens from 
reformatting their hard drives and installing pirated copies of Windows?’.  
38 Let me mention a few dimensions which do not appear in my study:  
•  What is the effect of the new technology of information and communication on the relationship 
between individuals, social groups, settlements, countries, and states? What can be expected 
concerning the relationship between high-tech information and communication, on the one hand, 
and the nation-state and globalization, on the other? (Castells 1996-1998; Nyíri 2004: 5-34; 
Webster 2004). 
•  The future of capitalism. Does the new age of information lead to a radical change of the basic 
properties of capitalism? Or does it create a new system which cannot be called capitalism any 
more? (two Hungarian economists, Katalin Szabó and Balázs Hámori (2006) wrote an 
interesting book with the following subtitle Digital capitalism or a new economic system. See 
Haug (2003.)  
•  How does the revolutionary change of information and communication technology affect the 
practical mode of running a business, especially in the financial sector?  
•  What are the implications of the new Information Age concerning property rights, especially 
with respect to intellectual property? 
•  A quite different direction of thought is to reconsider at a more abstract philosophical level our 
general understanding of human history. What is the role of the changes in the technology of 
production and human interaction on the institutions of society, and on the functions of the 
government?   34
I wish I were younger, with all the energy needed for the careful exploration of the 
white area as a whole. What an exciting and intellectually challenging subject for 
research! I hope that my study will encourage others to enter this largely under-
researched field. In any case, I would like to continue the study of the interaction 
between the change of the political and economic spheres of the system and the 
properties of technical progress. 
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